No. 45 (2021): The political gap and causes of its growth: the case of Spain
Articles

Affective polarization, negative partisanship and perceptual gap. A theoretical approach

Ismael Crespo Martínez
University of Murcia
Antonio Garrido Rubia
University of Murcia
M. Antonia Martínez Rodríguez
University of Murcia
Alberto Mora Rodríguez
Universidad de Murcia

Keywords

  • Polarización,
  • brecha,
  • confianza,
  • democracia
  • Polarization,
  • gap,
  • trust,
  • democracy

How to Cite

Crespo Martínez , I., Garrido Rubia , A., Martínez Rodríguez , M. A., & Mora Rodríguez, A. (2021). Affective polarization, negative partisanship and perceptual gap. A theoretical approach. Más Poder Local, (45), 7-20. Retrieved from https://www.maspoderlocal.com/index.php/mpl/article/view/polarizacion-afectiva-aproximacion-teorica-mpl45

Abstract

In contemporary societies there is a development of feelings of animosity and polarization between opposing groups. Gaps are being created that not only have repercussions in the social sphere. It also has relevant consequences for the normal development of the political and institutional activity of societies and for democratic quality. This article advances in the conceptualization of the term “polarization”, as well as the alternatives to its form of measurement and methodological approach.

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